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Resolving Medical Controversies
Itzhak Jacoby*
Ongoing Controversies
Several factors ensure that the number of unresolved controversies
concerning medical technology will increase. First, there are insufficient
resources to perform all the experiments that could resolve them solely
on the basis of scientific evidence. Even if the safety and efficacy is
found for an experimental population, controversy may arise regarding
the generalizability of the results to populations that differ by age, sex,
race or ethnic origin, severity of the condition or other attributes.
'Uncertainties always need to be resolved by practitioners in practice,
and variations in the application of a technology are endless.
Consider, e.g., the recent trial on carotid endarterectomy (for
removing atherosclerotic plaque from the major blood vessels in the
neck leading to the brain). One scientifically sound clinical trial showed
this procedure safe and effective in preventing strokes from severely
occluded carotid arteries. A second trial was required to prove efficacy
for persons with partialocclusions. Left to the discretion of surgeons,
insurers and patients is the degree of occlusion that justifies surgery in
patients of a certain age, sex and set of comorbidities. A confounding
factor is that the procedure improves function and reduces mortality
from stroke but seems to have no effect on reducing overall mortality.
When ultrasound became available and was shown to be safe, it was
believed useful to screen all pregnancies. Experience has shown that
little useful information is obtained in uneventful pregnancies. One
controlled study suggests that ultrasound prenatal screening in low risk
pregnancies is associated with worse-than-otherwise outcomes. 1
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The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), mandated that a
type of breast implant be removed from the market. Also, a class action
later obtained a $4 billion settlement in favor of women who had
received the implants. Yet, a study at the Mayo Clinic found no
2
relationship between the implants and disease.
Support for prostate cancer screening using the prostate specific
antigen test is equivocal. It produces a high rate of false positives that
could instigate unnecessary and potentially harmful treatment. 3 Also,
the indication for treatment of this slowly-developing cancer is
doubtful. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of public pressure to use
this screening test as well as to treat prostate cancer aggressively, as
promoted in subway placards featuring movie stars and congressmen.
The Need for Resolution
The pace of renewal and replacement of medical technologies has
markedly increased. For emerging technologies, issues of efficacy, costeffectiveness and safety must be resolved. For a strong healthcare
delivery system, it is critical to do so as expeditiously as possible. This
rarely occurs, however, for lack of an effective process. Existing
processes are neither timely nor efficient - nor are their outcomes
widely accepted. Medical practice guidelines, recently more
systematically developed, have been found to have little utility. Thus,
voluble policy debates rage, often pitting advocacy groups against
health insurers, with people's health and billions of dollars at stake.
Ambiguity about appropriate use of a medical technology leads
practitioners to differ in its use and insurance coverage to vary.
Scientific uncertainty multiplies the likelihood that individuals
adversely affected or denied coverage will litigate and burden courts
with the need to decide whether care or coverage decisions are
2
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appropriate. 4 Not surprisingly, therefore, such cases are increasingly
litigated. 5 Yet, they are often very costly and have inconsistent, if not
capricious, outcomes.
When a woman died after a claim for bone marrow transplantation
to treat breast cancer was denied, the family sued. A court awarded $89
million. Lack of evidence of efficacy did not protect Blue Cross/Blue
Shield (BC/BS) from liability. 6 Coverage has since" become more
widespread, e.g., it was recently extended to all federal government
employees. 7
Current Options
Litigation determines fault in a given case but does not resolve the
core controversy. Civil trials do not ensure that scientific evidence is
complete or comprehensible - much less balanced. Its apparent merit
may be influenced by verbal skills of witnesses or attorneys. The judge
or jury may not be able to assimilate the information. In short, while
legal decisions banish uncertainty by fiat, conflict about further use or
coverage of a technology will continue until uncertainty is otherwise
removed, directly and indirectly raising healthcare costs for everyone
by stimulating defensive medicine. Judicial shortcomings are matched
by deficiencies in its scientific counterparts. Thus, the need to develop a
process to resolve medical controversies is urgent - particularly one
that combines the best of judicial and scientific principles.
More than 50 agencies and organizations resolve medical
controversies, including the FDA and the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), 8 the American Medical Association, the
American College of Physicians' medical specialty societies and
insurance companies all participate in healthcare technology assessment.
4 Gina Kolata, Implants: Courts Dispose While Science Unfolds, The New York
Times, June 19, 1994, § 4, at 5.
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HCFA and BC/BS each exert important influence. Specialty societies
also occasionally provide leadership. For example, the American
College of Ophthalmology recently resolved a controversy by stating
that drug store nonprescription reading glasses are adequate for people
with otherwise uncomplicated visual needs.
Also, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, a relative
newcomer in DHHS, administers a program to develop standards of
medical practice. This program gathers evidence and develops practice
guidelines. Although its approach is logical, guidelines are costly to
develop. Also, a recent evaluation suggests that they may only be
marginally useful. 9 About two-thirds of the applications of
technologies covered by guidelines were found to fall outside the stated
policies. Yet, they were considered by the evaluators to be within the
bounds of good medicine. Medical groups and others ask whether
appropriate individuals prepare guidelines and whether it is reasonable
to expect them to cover the array of indications and contraindications
involved in care decisions. Such programs tend to neglect the most
difficult and controversial applications, further diluting their usefulness.
The completeness of evidence presented to a panel depends upon
the skills of presenters invited by the conference planning committee.
As in litigation, nothing assures balance. As with other scientific
conferences, there is little advance scrutiny of evidence and no
procedure for cross-examination. Sometimes, evidence is insufficient to
support a rational decision. Opportunity for public comment is
generally limited; and, although attendees and others can submit views
in writing, there is no assurance that their views will be considered.
Ironically, consensus development does not require that a panel take a
stand on difficult issues. Thus, conclusions are often weak. 10
Reforming a Process Based on "Science Court" Principles
Emulated internationally, the process used by the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), also within DHHS, is the most visible of its
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Identifying Health Techno9
logies that Work Searching for Evidence (1994).
10 Drummond Rennie, Consensus Statements, 304 N. Eng. J. Med. 65 (1981).
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kind. Panel members respond to pre-posed questions to produce a
consensus reflecting their assessment of evidence. Panelists obtain
information through briefing materials provided by NIH staff and
invited scientists. Attendees can make public statements, but the
consensus document is developed in executive session. It is presented at
a press conference on the morning of the third day.1 1
Despite a logical construct, consensus conferences now have flaws.
For example, NIH sponsors are themselves stakeholders. That topics
are selected by NIH with little involvement of others tends to avoid
issues on which the clinical community needs urgent guidance. Often,
too, panels that are generally neutral include individuals with some
stake in the technology being reviewed.
An effective process begins by selecting issues with strong policy
implications. Joint sponsorship by the federal government and
important healthcare players - the research community, providers,
payers, and the public - will help ensure that potential topics are
debated and that those selected involve a significant discrepancy
between available knowledge and its practical application. Participation
of all interested groups is also likely to result in impartiality of process
custodians and to contribute to a broad sense of ownership of, and
support for, conclusions.
The most important criterion for issue selection is a strong, albeit
controversial, base of scientific evidence about the technology to
support an empirical discussion of its merits. Data should come both
from .planned studies and "naturally occurring experiments" in day-today practice. Because of its complexity, data synthesis should be
formalized, using the most up-to-date tools. Synthesis could employ
meta-analytic or decision theoretic modeling. The consensus process at
the heart of the conflict resolution should allow for thorough debate of
issues, providing balance in the presentations of opposing viewpoints.
1 2 It
The "Science Court" model fulfills most of these criteria.
offers broad stakeholder input, impartial sponsorship and adjudication,
11 Fitzhugh Mullan & Itzhak Jacoby, The Town Meeting for Technology: The
Maturation of Consensus Conferences, 254 J.A.M.A. 8 (1985).
12 See, e.g., Itzhak Jacoby, Consensus Development at NIH. What Went Wrong?
4 Risk 133 (1993).
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managed preparation and presentation of evidence, and thorough airing
of facts via cross-examination. Case managers, who would translate
opposing views of an issue into scientific facts, represent the critical
feature most lacking in existing processes. Individuals or interest
groups, carefully selected for expertise and constituency, would present
their arguments to a referee or judge before allowing scrutiny by
opposing case managers. Challenge of the other manager's statements
would trigger mediation. The challenge resolution procedure would
involve both oral and written presentations, in an effort to produce
statements of the highest possible validity within time constraints.
While some aspects of this process could vary, each case manager would
definitely have the right to cross-examine the other. 13
Selection of judges and referees would also involve consultation
with appropriate scientific societies and organizations to assure unusual
scientific capability and no obvious connection to the disputed issue.
Also, case managers would examine proposed names for prejudice.
A new process for medical controversy resolution should address a
broad range of issues, including safety, efficacy, cost and related
economic concerns, quality of life, ethical and legal concerns.
Statements issued as a result of the process should be subjected to
extensive review to ensure that issues are adequately addressed and
findings reasonably supported. The process and outcomes should be
monitored over time and evaluated occasionally to identify means of
improvement. Embracing all of the Science Court principles, a new
approach should gain wide public acceptance, provide sound guidance
for the practice of medicine and maintenance of public health, and
eliminate the worst inefficiencies of the current system.

13 Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in
Science and Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193
Science 654 (1976).

